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In an efficient market, differences in quality should be fully reflected in 
differences in price.  This paper examines a highly active residential property 
market and verifies whether housing attributes can explain time on the market 
(TOM) in addition to prices.  In contrast to the previous literature, only the 
price ratio and inflation factor are found to be critical in affecting TOM.  An 









The study of time on the market (TOM)
1  is not only interesting for practical 
purposes (such as pricing strategy for brokers and sellers), but also in 
academic research.  A typical modern graduate microeconomics textbook 
will provide rigorous proof that a centralized market in which there is perfect 
information will instantaneously “clear,” and that the difference in the 
market prices for the same type of goods produced by different firms should 
                                                 
1 Throughout this paper, TOM is defined as the number of days between the listing date of the 
housing unit and the transaction date. 92 Leung, Leong and Chan 
   
reflect differences in the quality of goods
2.   Therefore, the TOM for a 
centralized market with perfect information will be zero.  
 
This theoretical prediction is in sharp contrast to the observed situation in the 
second-hand market for housing units.  First, there are always vacant 
housing units and potential buyers in the market. The market is decentralized 
and does not “clear” all the time. TOM is typically non-zero. Second, some 
research papers suggest that the transaction price for the housing unit does 
not seem to reflect all the information about the unit.  If it does, when the 
TOM variable is run against the transaction price, other variables (such as 
physical and locational attributes) should not contain any information and 
the corresponding coefficients should all be insignificantly different from 
zero.  A voluminous literature clearly indicates that the opposite is true
3.   In 
a typical “TOM-regression,” the TOM is on the left hand side and the listing 
and transaction prices with the physical and locational attributes are on the 
right-hand-side.  While the exact functional forms and econometric 
strategies vary across papers, the literature implicitly assumes that the 
differences in transaction price are unable to capture the differences in 
attribute, and that the potential sellers somehow differentiate their products 
along the time dimension.  This view of the housing market is supported by 
some recent theoretical work
4.   
 
This paper re-examines the empirical determinants for TOM using a unique 
sample: the residential property market of Hong Kong during the 1990s.  In 
particular, we will focus on estates on the most frequently traded list
5.   
There are at least two justifications for this choice of sample.  First, 
apartment units within this sample are very likely to be more homogeneous 
than the houses (many of them detached) studied in previous research
6.   
Second, trading during the 1990s was very heavy in the residential market.  
According to the calculations of Leung, Cheng, and Leong (2002), the ratio 
of total number of transactions relative to the total stock of residential 
housing during the 1990s was typically above 10%, with 20% in the peak 
year of 1997
7.   Such unusual market liquidity should provide an accurate 
                                                 
2 For instance, see Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (1995). 
3 The literature is too large to be surveyed here.  See Anglin (1994, 1999), Anglin, Rutherford, 
and Springer (2001), and the references therein. 
4 For instance, see Haurin (1988), Taylor (1999). 
5 An “estate” in Hong Kong is similar to a “housing development” in the U.S. (i.e. a group of 
buildings built in the same neighbourhood at about the same time).  Estates in Hong Kong can 
be very large.  For instance, the “Taikoo Shing” estate has about 30 buildings, each with more 
than 20 floors.  On each floor, there are several apartment units. 
6 For instance, the several apartment units on the same floor have exactly the same height.  The 
several hundred apartment units in the same building were of exactly the same age.  Also, 
Haurin (1988) showed that the more typical a housing unit, the shorter the marketing time. 
7 The corresponding figure for the United States during the same period was less than 5%.  
Needless to say, there are great variations between cities. TOM: Why Isn’t Price Enough? 93 
 
estimate of the housing price, and hence significantly enhance the bargaining 
process between the buyers and sellers, as well as shorten the marketing 
time
8.   
 
In fact, this paper found that the most important factors in explaining TOM 
are the ratio between the listing price and the selling price
9  and the inflation 
factor, whereas physical and locational attributes were found to be 
insignificant.  This finding is in sharp contrast to those of the previous 
literature.  The result was obtained by splitting our sample (which included 
more than 11,000 transactions) into 14 half-year sub-samples
10 .   
Interestingly, when the sub-samples were pooled together, as has been done 
in much of the previous literature, some physical and locational attributes 
became statistically significant.  Some interpretations are proposed for these 
findings. 
 
Needless to say, this paper builds on the many insights of the previous 
literature.  However, due to the space limit, it can only refer  interested 
readers to Chan (2002) for a literature review.  Table 1 provides a selective 
summary.  In sum, the current work differs from previous studies in several 
dimensions.  It is based on a larger sample, and is able to examine the data as 
a series of cross-sectional regressions.  This enables us to examine whether 
the coefficients of different variables fluctuate significantly over time and 
hence eliminate a potential bias due to mis-specifications.  It also provides 
an indirect test for potential structural change in the Hong Kong housing 
market due to the 1997 handover or the Asian Financial Crisis.  If there is a 
large structural change in the market, then we would expect the explanatory 
power of the model to fall sharply over time.  This research also includes 










                                                 
8 In addition, Hong Kong does not have a capital gains tax nor capital controls, but has an 
essentially flat and low tax rate, and maintained the same fixed exchange rate during the sample 
period.  It may have attracted some foreign investors to participate in the market during this 
period, although the government does not have any formal record of this.  For more details of 
the Hong Kong housing market, see Chow, et. al. (2002) and Leung, Lau, and Leong (2002). 
9 The terms “selling price” and “transaction price” will be used interchangeably. 
10The section on methodology below provides justifications for this approach.  94 Leung, Leong and Chan 
   
 
Table 1:  Comparison with the Previous Literature 
  Method Period Sample
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Table 2:  Comparison of the Results 




























Constant  3.219 
* -3.59
 * 8.40 
** -6.217
* 31.40
 ** 2.8484 
** 
(asking - transaction) / 
transaction  5.501
 *             
asking price/transaction 
price     5.8 
*         
asking price        4.59 E-3 
** 0.450    0.0880 
** 
transaction price                
small price group     -0.037 
*        
high price group     0.049 
*         
degree of overpricing             1.3
 **  
degree of overpricing -- sq             1.98 
*  
highest offer received as a           6.607
*    
proportion of asking price                
* Statistically significant at the 5% level, ** statistically significant at the 1% level 
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Table 2:  Comparison of the Results (Cont’d) 


























small area group   -0.012        
large area group   0.085        
Area     2.93  E-2 
* 0.152 0.34  
Area – sq     -8.45  E-4 
**  0.01  
ln (deviation from the 
median area) 
-0.008         
Age     1.82  E-2 
**  -0.12  
Age – sq     -3.72  E-4
 **  -0.00  
ln age  0.161 
*         
Flat       0.094    
Terraced       0.098    
semi-detached       -0.067    
Garage       -0.060    
no garage         1.16 
**  
* Statistically significant at the 5% level, ** statistically significant at the 1% level 
 























bedrooms     6.75  E-2      
bedrooms -- sq     1.83  E-3      
2 bedroom       -0.075 -0.33 
*  
3 bedroom       -0.117    
4 bedroom       -0.022 -0.07  
5 bedroom         -0.37 
*  
bathrooms     -0.12 -0.058    
bathrooms -- sq     1.20  E-2      
stories         0.25 
**  
fireplace     -6.67  E-2  -0.07  
heated area           -0.0005 
**
pool     -5.49  E-2   -0.19 
**  
* Statistically significant at the 5% level, ** statistically significant at the 1% level 
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Table 2:  Comparison of the Results (Cont’d) 



























Winter        -0.33 
**    
Spring        -0.2 
**  0.08 -0.4359 
**
Summer        -7.42 E-3   -0.51 
* -0.3280 
**
Fall            -0.63 
** 0.0944
interest rates trend        4.45 
**    
mortgage interest rate            -4.24 
**  
unemployment trend        -1.51 
**    
* Statistically significant at the 5% level, ** statistically significant at the 1% level 
 
 
Table 2c: Housing Market and Miscellaneous Factors 


























broker size       -1.34 E-4 
*   
inventory in housing 
market 
       1.07
 **  
sales in a month         0.22
 *  
market duration set with 
broker 
   0.057 
*     
housing appliances listed         0.009   
no offer         0.832   
houses have a financial 
distress recently 
     0.33 
**   
noise contour level           0.0530
* Statistically significant at the 5% level, ** statistically significant at the 1% level 
 
The organization of this paper is as follows.  The next section provides a 
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The empirical findings and interpretations of these findings are presented in 





The residential property data that is used in this paper was provided by the 
Economic Property Research Centre (EPRC)
11.   Houses for rental were 
excluded.  The sampling period runs from January 1993 to December 1999.  
There are a total of 12,180 transactions, but only 11,612 transactions with 
complete records remain in the data set.  These are further divided into 14 
half-year sub-samples according to the transaction date. 
 
We only focused on the most frequently traded list provided by the EPRC, 
comprising about forty estates
12.   There are some limitations to this sample.  
First, there is no individual household panel data set available in Hong Kong, 
and hence it is virtually impossible to detect the “seller motivations,” which 
may be important for determining TOM
13.   Second, in Hong Kong, the 
number of bedrooms, bathrooms, etc. in a housing unit may be changed at 
any time without the need to report to the government
14.   Therefore, these 
potentially important variables are not included in the regression.  Given 
these limitations, the explanatory variables that can be used are divided into 
four categories – price characteristics, physical characteristics, location 




                                                 
11 In Hong Kong, all housing transactions need to be registered, and the EPRC simply compiles 
the data files from the Hong Kong Government.  For more details about the EPRC, see Leung, 
Lau, and Leong (2002).  Apart from the EPRC, this paper is also the source for some 
macroeconomic variables used in many government documents.  Many real estate agent websites 
use information from the same paper regarding some of the physical characteristics of the 
housing units. 
12 There are several reasons for this.  First, some estates are extremely luxurious relative to the 
others and may therefore distort the sample.  Second, some estates are rarely subject to 
transactions, and this may affect the results artificially.  More importantly, the government does 
not provide information on the age of the buildings, and so we are dependent on the websites of 
several real estate agents that only provide information on those more frequently traded.  If we 
enlarge the sample to include other estates, then it would become impossible to identify the age 
of properties.  See Chan (2002) for more details. 
13 For instance, see Glower, Haurin, and Hendershott (1998), who employed a small sample of 
survey data, and Anglin, Rutherford, and Springer (2001) for a much larger sample without 
survey data. 
14  Obviously, it could be dangerous to add bathrooms to an apartment without permission.   
However, it is easy to decrease the number of bathrooms and bedrooms. 
14 Implicitly, we have assumed that, on average, higher quality housing units will have a higher 
price per square foot. 98 Leung, Leong and Chan 
   
 
Table 3: Factors Used in the Regression Model 
   Factors Used in Regression  Symbol Used 
   Price Factors    
1  High Price Group  HP 
2  Low Price Group  LP 
3  Nominal Price Ratio  P-Ratio 
   Physical Characteristics    
4  Age Age 
5  Floor Floor 
6  Area Area 
   Locational Characteristics    
7  MTR M500 
8  LRT L500 
9  Bay   B500 
10  Police Station  P500 
11  Hong Kong Island  HK 
12  Kowloon KLN 
   Macroeconomic Factors    
13  Gross Domestic Product  GDP 
14  Growth rate of Loan  Loan Growth 
15  Interest Rate  IR 





Factors 1 & 2: High/Low Price Group (HP/LP) 
 
As the market can be segmented into different “classes” due to differences in 
“quality,” we divided the housing units into three different groups, according 
to the real transaction price per square foot15.   We used the medium price 
group as our control group in the regression, and treated the high price group 
(HP) and low price group (LP) as dummy variables in our regression. 
 
                                                 
15 Implicitly, we have assumed that, on average, higher quality housing units will have a higher 
price per square foot. TOM: Why Isn’t Price Enough? 99 
 
 
Factor 3: Nominal Price Ratio (P-Ratio) 
 
In each transaction, we divided the nominal listing price by nominal 
transaction price to get the nominal price ratio16.  The literature (such as 




Factor 4: Age 
 
This denotes the time between the transaction year and the year the 
households were allowed to move into the estate
17.   The age of some of the 
housing units is equal to 0 or even –1, which corresponds to advance sales 
before completion.  When focusing on the secondhand market, we 
eliminated these transactions; they amounted to about 3.5% of our sample. 
 
Factor 5: Floor 
 
This data comes from the EPRC.  Many estates in Hong Kong are at least 30 
stories high, and some people may prefer upper floor units because they have 
better views and are less noisy.  In our data set, some of the housing units are 
on the ground floor.  These cases represent about 0.7% of our total data set 
and have been excluded for two reasons: they only occur in detached 
housing units, and the ground floor of a typical building is usually reserved 
for retail shops
18.   
 
Factor 6: Area 
 
The EPRC provides two types of area data: the gross area and the net area.  
The gross area is used for two reasons.  Only a small portion of the units has 
information on the net area.  More importantly, during the sampling period, 
there was neither official regulation nor professional consensus about how to 
measure the net area.  Therefore, the “net area” reported by real estate 
developers is subject to personal bias and varies between developers.  To 
                                                 
16  We also included an inflation factor in the regression model to control for the effect of 
inflation.  In any case, it seems that the inflation distortion is marginal because for most of the 
transactions, TOM is less than 50 days. 
17 In Hong Kong, especially during the early 1990s, the real estate market was prosperous, and 
newly-built houses or sales of pre-built houses were popular.  They were also frequently traded 
in the second-hand real estate market.  The information on “age” is not contained in the EPRC 
data files, and we have searched and verified this information on various real estate agent 
websites. 
18 Also, some of the units on the ground floor are a mixture of a residential unit and a retail store.  
In order to facilitate a focus on the residential market, these have been deleted from the sample. 100 Leung, Leong and Chan 
   
avoid yet another potential source of measurement error in the sample, only 





Factors 7 & 8: MTR/LRT (M500 / L500) 
 
There are three major railway systems in Hong Kong.  The MTR is its 
subway system, with 44 stations, while the KCR is its railway system linking 
Hong Kong to China, with 13 stations.  The Light Rail (LRT) serves only the 
northwestern portion of the New Territories.   
 
Factors 7 and 8 measure the distance between the housing estates and the 
nearest railway station.  Dummy variable “M500” takes the value of unity if 
there is a MTR Railway station within 500 meters of the house
19.  Similarly, 
dummy variable “L500” takes the value of unity if there is a Light Rail 
station within 500 meters of the house.   A location near a railway system 
may be treated as a location convenience, but may also imply a noisy 
environment.  We have not constructed another dummy variable “K500” for 
estates within 500 meters of KCR stations, as only 2% of the sample will 
take unity value for this dummy. 
 
Factor 9: Bay (B500) 
 
This factor measures the distance between the housing estate and the nearest 
bay or harbor.  Being close to a bay or a harbor may imply a lower variation 
in temperature, proximity to water-view resort places
20,  or a faster corrosion 
of furniture and appliances.  A dummy variable “B500” was constructed to 
distinguish the effect of having a bay within 500 meters from the estate. 
 
Factor 10: Police Station (P500) 
 
Housing estates located near a police station may give residents a sense of 
security.  A dummy variable “P500” is constructed, which equals 1, if the 
nearest police station is within 500 meters of the estate. 
 
Factors 11 & 12: Hong Kong Island/Kowloon (HK/KLN) 
 
                                                 
19 The distance “500 meters” is somewhat arbitrary, and we also considered a distance of 400 
and 600 meters.  The results are unchanged, and hence we focused on the case of “500 meters”.  
See Chan (2002) for details. 
20 Estate developers typically build a private resort place within the estate so that residents can 
easily enjoy water views during their leisure time. TOM: Why Isn’t Price Enough? 101 
 
Geographically, Hong Kong can be divided into three parts: Hong Kong 
Island, Kowloon Peninsula, and the New Territories.  The housing estates 
were divided up according to their locations.  We used the New Territories 
as our control group in the regression and treated Hong Kong Island (HK) 






Factor 13: Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
 
We collected the quarterly data for gross domestic product (GDP), measured 
at the constant market price for the year 1990.  We used an  intrapolation 
method to convert the quarterly GDP data into its monthly counterpart.  This 
factor represents the general economic situation of Hong Kong for that 
period. 
 
Factor 14: Growth Rate of Loan (Loan Growth) 
 
As the real estate market may be subject to credit rationing
22,  this variable 
was included to capture the loan market situation.  It also reflects the 
expectations of the financial industry in relation to the real estate market
23.   
As the series for real loans is statistically non-stationary
24,  we used the 
growth rate, which is stationary, for regression. 
 
Factor 15: Interest Rate (IR) 
 
The interest rate is often regarded as the opportunity cost for real estate 
investment.  A one-year Exchange Fund Note (henceforth EFN) is widely 
perceived as a risk-free investment, since it is essentially Hong Kong’s 
version of the T-bill.  The interest rate of the EFN during the sample period 
is non-stationary, and hence we have used the de-trended EFN rate for the 
regression. 
 
Factor 16: Inflation factor (CPI Ratio) 
 
This was calculated using the CPI(A) in the asking month divided by the 
CPI(A) in the transaction month. 
 
                                                 
21 All the data used in this section was collected from various government documents. 
22 See Leung, Lau, and Leong (2002), among others, for evidence. 
23 See Chen (2001) for more discussion on this. 
24  We divided the monthly data for loans to the construction sector by the corresponding 
consumer price index CPI (A) to obtain the real loan. 102 Leung, Leong and Chan 
   
Dependent Variable – Time on the market (TOM) 
 
The time on the market, TOM, is the number of days between the listing day 
and the transaction day
25.   The following tables provide more details. 
 
Table 4a:  Summary of Statistics 
  Max. Mean  Median Min.  S.D. 
TOM (day)  3002 301.67  81  1  460.73 
P-Ratio  4.57 1.073 1.039 0.234  0.261 
Age (year)  22 7.05  6  1  5.19 
Area (sq. ft.)  2771 775.83  745  136  268.47 
Floor  45 14.89  14  1  9.93 
GDP  220.93 194.03  195  159.24  14.16 
Loan Growth  0.522 0.012  0.009 -0.324 0.06 
IR  0.326 0.001 -0.003 -0.271 0.09 
Inflation  1.06 0.96  0.99  0.63 0.07 
 
Table 4b:  Summary of Statistics (dummy variables) 
Variables  No. in all sample 
M500  3338 
L500  1474 
B500  7631 
P500  6671 
HK  4257 
KLN  2920 
1993  1512 
1994  1207 
1995  1596 
1996  2727 
1997  2319 
1998  1280 
1999  971 
 Total Number of Transactions  11,612  
 
                                                 
25 In our sample, some transaction records imply that the value of TOM is equal to 0.  They 
constitute about 0.6% of our sample and were excluded from the analysis. TOM: Why Isn’t Price Enough? 103 
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Note:“50 days” means that the transaction was done between 0 to 50 days; “100 days” 





This paper uses a simple structure to capture the factors determining TOM.  
We will focus on the results from a duration model.  We will also report 
results of Chan (2002) for comparison.  Chan (2002) adopted the same data 
set as this paper, and she also split the sample on a half-yearly basis.  Chan 
reached essentially the same conclusions using a simple OLS regression.   
She ran a simple cross-sectional regression for each period: 
 
TOM = β0 + β1 P + β2 L + β3 M + ε    (1) 
 
with P representing the price and the quantifiable physical characteristics of 
the house such as the gross area of the house, L representing locational 
factors such as railway network, and other public facilities (such as a police 
station), and M representing macroeconomic factors such as the gross 
domestic product.  ε is the error term in the regression, with βI I, I = 1, 2, … 
etc., being the vector of coefficients obtained for each period.  104 Leung, Leong and Chan 
   
Notice that this formulation allows the coefficients of different variables β 
to vary over time
26.  This may occur, for instance, when there are some 
underlying changes in regulation (such as a legal minimum for the down 
payment as a share of the housing price) and/or political regime.  The 
sampling period is from 1993 to 1999, and is indeed longer than most studies 
in the literature.  There were important changes in the government 
regulations and macroeconomic situation for this period, including the 
handover of Hong Kong to China in 1997 and the “anti-speculation policies” 
introduced by the government in 1994 and 1997
27 .  Time-varying 
coefficients may emerge.  To control for these, the whole sample was split 
into 14 sub-samples, each of which is equal in length (half a year).  The 
results from this procedure will be compared with results derived after 
pooling all of the data together
28.  To check the validity of the data, a log 
linear regression for TOM was also run, as suggested in some of the 
literature
29:   
 
ln TOM = β0 + β1 lnP + β2 lnL + β3 lnM + ε   (2) 
 
Chan (2002) also considered models with interacting terms, and found that 
the results are qualitatively the same.  
 
However, there is a problem with this approach.  The TOM variable, by 
definition, is non-negative.  Also, the OLS approach presumes that the price 
ratio is independent of time on the market, which is clearly untrue.   
Following the literature, we employed a duration model to estimate the effect 
of different variables on time in the market
30.   Formally, we used the 
maximum likelihood method to estimate the following model for each period: 
 
ln TOM = β0 + β1 P + β2 L + β3 M + ε    (3) 
 
Interestingly, we found that the qualitative results for the two approaches are 




                                                 
26 Time-varying parameter values are not uncommon in the real estate literature.  For instance, 
these were documented in the hedonic pricing literature.  See Leung, Cheng, and Leong (2002) 
for a discussion. 
27 See Law (2000) for an account of  changes in Hong Kong housing policy during the 1990s. 
28 When a regression is run with all the data pooling together, six “year dummy” variables: 
“1993,” “1994,” “1995,” “1996,” “1997,” and “1998” were also introduced. 
29 Only continuous variables such as age and price ratio are in log form, while dummy variables 
still enter the equation as “linear” terms. 






As a benchmark, the results from a simple linear regression will be 
reported
31.   As there are a total of 14 sub-periods, it is possible that the 
estimated coefficients of the same variable appear positively significant for 
some periods and at the same time negatively significant in some other 
periods.  Thus, it will be useful to see how often the coefficients of different 
variables were found to be significant.  As summarized in Table 5, physical 
and locational characteristics are almost always insignificant.  Apart from 
the inflation factor, macroeconomic factors (GDP, Loan growth, and the 
interest rate) are unstable in the sense that significant proportions of their 
corresponding coefficients are positively significant, while other significant 
proportions are negatively significant
32.   
  
Table 5a: Values of the Coefficients of the Semi-Annual Line Regression 





Significant at the 
0.05 Level 
Insignificant 
Constant  6163.19 5921.75 1779.89 100.00%  0.00%  0.00% 
HP  -2.67 -2.73 4.87  0.00%  14.29%  85.71% 
LP  1.98 2.58 18.63  7.14%  0.00%  92.86% 
P-Ratio  62.38 -36.55  256.99 28.57%  64.29%  7.14% 
Age  -0.39 0.03  1.1  14.29%  7.14%  78.57% 
Floor  0.12 -0.01  0.48  0.00%  7.14%  92.86% 
Area  0 0 0.02  7.14% 7.14%  85.71% 
M500  1.62 1.05 6.32  14.29%  0.00%  85.71% 
L500  5.52 1.53 15.58  0.00%  14.29%  85.71% 
B500  -1.17 -0.3  5.14  0.00%  0.00%  100.00% 
P500  5.24 -1.25  22.75  7.14%  0.00%  92.86% 
HK  -0.25 -0.63 13.86  0.00%  7.14%  92.86% 
KLN  -4.76 2.46  21.79  7.14%  0.00%  92.86% 
GDP  -2.18 -1.37 6.72  28.57%  50.00%  21.43% 
Loan Growth 1029.68 -42.92  4349.67 35.71%  21.43%  42.86% 
IR  -104.61 -34.25  270.43  28.57%  50.00%  21.43% 
Inflation  -5750.51 -5531.54 1282.36 0.00%  100.00%  0.00% 
Note: We put the figures bold when they exceeded 51%. 
                                                 
31 To check for the robustness of our results, a log linear regression model was also run.  The 
details of the log linear regression results can be found in Chan (2002).  Suffice to say that the 
simple linear regression model can provide a higher explanatory power, since values for both R-
square and R bar square are much higher.  In addition, there are more significant point estimates 
in the simple linear regression model.  Chan (2002) also ran regressions using interacting terms 
in both linear and log linear regression.  Again, the major results remained unchanged. 
32 In fact, based on the OLS regressions, Chan (2002) conducted further diagnoses and showed 
that in terms of explaining the difference in TOM across transactions, the inflation rate and price 
ratio are far more important than all the other variables combined. 106 Leung, Leong and Chan 
   
Table 5b:  Values of the Coefficients of the (Pooled) Linear Regression 
Variables Estimates   
Constant  6083.86 ** 
HP  -3.83  
LP  -0.04  
P-Ratio  266.14 ** 
Age  -0.37  
Floor  0.10  
Area  0.01  
M500  4.28  
L500  -13.41 ** 
B500  0.63  
P500  1.75  
HK  -1.93  
KLN  -7.93 * 
GDP  1.16 ** 
Loan Growth  -1.06  
IR  -151.87 ** 
Inflation  -6216.44 ** 
1993  -384.51 ** 
1994  -383.31 ** 
1995  -437.91 ** 
1996  -393.58 ** 
1997  -346.86 ** 
1998  -310.26 ** 
*Significantly different from zero at the 95 percent level of confidence 
**Significantly different from zero at the 99 percent level of confidence 
 
The inflation factor is always negatively significant.  Other things being 
equal, a higher inflation rate leads to a lower real transaction price; buyers 
are more willing to purchase, and the time on the market will be shortened.  
 
Almost two-thirds of the coefficients of the price ratio variable are 
negatively significant, with only about one quarter matching the expected 
sign, which is positively significant.  Chan (2002) further showed that the 
negative coefficients were typically concentrated in the period before the 
1997 handover, while the positive coefficients typically appeared after the 
handover.  This result is in contrast to many previous studies summarized in 
Table 2, and may be due to the fact that there are many housing market 
speculators who wait patiently for high-price buyers.  It may take a long time 
for this kind of buyer to appear on the market, however.  Thus, the lower 
price ratio (meaning that the transaction is high relative to the listing price) is 
associated with a higher TOM.  However, the negative coefficients may also 
come from a mis-specification of the model.  The OLS structure presumes TOM: Why Isn’t Price Enough? 107 
 
that the price ratio is exogenous to the TOM variable, which may not be true 
in practice.  To investigate this possibility, it is necessary to address the 
problem with an alternative approach.  Here, we follow the literature to 
adopt a duration model.  
 
Before we switch to the results from duration models, however, there are 
two points worth mentioning.  First, the explanatory power of the OLS 
model is high.  According to Chan (2002), the adjusted R-square of almost 
all the cross-sectional OLS is above 0.90, although there is a tendency for it 
to decrease after 1998.  It is somewhat surprising that such a simple structure 
can consistently produce a high adjusted R-square.  
 
Second, when all the data was pooled together, some locational variables 
(L500, KLN) became statistically significant.  The coefficient of the price 
ratio also became positive.  The year dummies are all significant.  These 
results are qualitatively the same as in the previous literature.  In addition, 
some macroeconomic variables (GDP, the interest rate) also became 
significant.  This suggests that the data-pooling procedure commonly 
adopted may have a non-trivial effect on the estimation results.  It will be 




As in the case of OLS regression, the regressions were first run on a semi-
annual basis.  The results are summarized in Table 6, and are highly 
consistent with the results from OLS regressions reported in an earlier 
section.  The physical and locational characteristics are almost always 
insignificant.  Most macroeconomic variables (GDP, loan growth, and the 
interest rate) are often insignificant.  The inflation factor is always negatively 
significant, as in the case of the OLS regression.  Other things being equal, a 
higher inflation rate is typically associated with a shorter period of time on 
the market.  The coefficients of the price ratio are now found to be positively 
significant in most periods, as the theory predicts.  In addition, when the data 
from different years was pooled together, some locational variables were 
found to be significant (Age, Area, and KLN).  The price ratio remained 
positively significant and the inflation rate remained negatively significant.  
The interest rate also became negatively significant.  These results are more 
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Table 6a:  Results from the Semi-Annual Duration Model  
Variables  Positively Significant 
at the 0.05 Level 
Negatively Significant 
at the 0.05 Level  Insignificant 
Constant  93%  0%  7% 
HP  0%  0%  100% 
LP  0%  0%  100% 
P-Ratio  71%  14%  14% 
Age  0%  0%  100% 
Floor  0%  0%  100% 
Area  7%  0%  93% 
M500  0%  0%  100% 
L500  7%  0%  93% 
B500  0%  0%  100% 
P500  14%  0%  86% 
HK  7%  7%  86% 
KLN  0%  7%  93% 
GDP  0%  14%  86% 
Loan Growth  20%  0%  80% 
IR  0%  29%  71% 
Inflation   0%  100%  0% 
 
Table 6b:  Results from the (Pooled) Duration Model  
Variables Estimates   
Constant  22.05 ** 
HP  0.03  
LP  0.03  
P-Ratio  1.32 ** 
Age  -0.01 ** 
Floor  0.00  
Area  0.00 ** 
M500  0.06  
L500  -0.02  
B500  0.00  
P500  0.00  
HK  -0.05  
KLN  -0.11 ** 
GDP  0.00  
Loan Growth  -0.18  
IR  -0.53 ** 
Inflation  -17.91 ** 
1993  -1.44 ** 
1994  -1.31 ** 
1995  -1.63 ** 
1996  -1.38 ** 
1997  -1.18 ** 
1998  -1.24 ** 
 **Significant at the 1% level; *Significant the 5% level. TOM: Why Isn’t Price Enough? 109 
 
 
Comparing the results of the OLS regression and the duration model, we 
found that there have been several changes.  First, the unstable 
macroeconomic variables that were “unstable” in the OLS regression were 
found to be consistently insignificant.  Second, the sign of the price ratio was 
changed from negatively significant (OLS) to positively significant (duration 
model), and made the results more in line with the theory.  This suggests that 
the OLS method may in fact introduce serious bias in the regression. 
 
Nonetheless, the major message seems to be robust to the change of the 
empirical procedure.  First, most macroeconomic variables do not seem to be 
important in explaining TOM, although the inflation rate is always a 
negatively significant factor.  This finding needs to be interpreted cautiously.  
Unlike the money growth rate, which is controlled by the government, the 
inflation rate is determined by the market, and thus depends on all other 
macroeconomic variables.  Thus, a high explanatory power in the inflation 
factor can be interpreted as evidence that the TOM is strongly related to the 
general condition of the economy.  
 
Second, physical and locational characteristics are typically insignificant, 
while the price ratio is typically important in the regression.  This may 
suggest that prices actually reflect the heterogeneity of different houses so 
well that the additional contributions of physical and locational factors are 
negligible.  Under this interpretation, the real estate market might be more 
efficient than has been usually perceived.  Alternatively, this result may 
merely suggest that the housing units in the sample are “too homogenous,” 
or because they are in the “most frequently traded list,” so that the physical 
and locational factors become unimportant.  More research needs to be 
carried out in the future to distinguish between these two possibilities. 
 
Third, the choice of the sampling period seems to be very important.  When 
we split the sample on a half-yearly basis, physical and locational attributes 
were always unimportant.  However, when we pooled the data together, 
some of these attributes became significant.  Also, the interest rate, which is 
either unstable or insignificant on a half-yearly basis, always became 
negatively significant in the pooled sample.  In other words, the level of time 
aggregation matters
33 .   This point may have been unintentionally 
overlooked in the previous literature, as a small sample size naturally 
precludes the possibility of splitting the sample into different sub-samples.  
The sample employed here is large enough to allow for both a series of 
cross-sectional regressions (half-yearly basis) and a pooled regression.  The 
                                                 
33  The time aggregation issue has long been recognized in economics.  For instance, see 
Christiano and Eichenbaum (1987) and Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Marshall (1991).  For a 
more general discussion of the aggregation issue, see Hanushek, Rivkin, and Taylor (1996). 110 Leung, Leong and Chan 
   
results here seem to suggest that pooling the data into one large sample 
would lead to bias and misleading conclusions.  The reasons behind this and 
the generality of these results still need to be explored.  
 
Some institutional differences may play a role in the difference in results.  
For instance, previous studies based on United States data typically include 
factors such as the number of bedrooms and bathrooms.  In Hong Kong, 
however, homeowners can remodel their homes at their convenience, and 
change the number of rooms without informing any government department.  
Obviously, the re-modeling decision may depend on the market situation, 
thus becoming a “missing” (and not redeemable) variable in the research
34.   
Thus, in a sense, the housing market in Hong Kong is more “flexible” and 
hence more “efficient”. 
 
It is interesting to note, however, that the institutional explanation is likely to 
be inadequate.  Once we pool all of the sub-samples together and re-run the 
“TOM-regression” with year dummies, as occurs typically  in the literature, 
some physical and locational characteristics become significant at the 95% 
confidence level, as typically found in the literature (see Tables 5 and 6).  
The conclusions alter, depending on whether the half-year time aggregation 
or the full sample was used.  Further research is required to determine to 
what extent this difference in results can be attributed to the time 





In this paper, with the advantage of a large data set and prolonged period of 
investigation, we modified the standard approach used to identify 
determinants of time on the market (TOM).  By running regression on a half-
yearly basis, we found that the “price factors” and the inflation factor are the 
major factors explaining TOM, while the physical and locational factors, as 
well as other macroeconomic variables, are typically insignificant.  This is in 
sharp contrast to the previous literature.  When all of the data was pooled 
together, as was done in previous research, some locational factors became 
statistically significant, as found in the previous literature.  This paper also 
gives an account of the reasons for the change in the relationship between 
the TOM and the other factors. 
 
Clearly, more research is needed to clarify several issues.  First, the inflation 
factor may be a proxy for some deeper structural movement within the 
aggregate economy, and the TOM is in fact determined by these aggregate 
                                                 
34 See Downing and Wallace (2002 a, b) for more elaborations on this point. TOM: Why Isn’t Price Enough? 111 
 
economy variables, rather than simply by the inflation factor.  More efforts 
should be devoted to investigate the relationship between the real estate 
market and the aggregate economy.  
 
Second, this research suggests that the level of time aggregation would 
indeed influence the results.  Future research should further explore this 
issue and provide a clear guidance on the optimal level of time aggregation.  
Third, the price-ratio was found to be positively and significantly correlated 
to the TOM, as many search theoretic models would suggest.  On the other 
hand, we found in this sample that the price-ratio and the inflation factor are 
the major determinants of TOM, as competitive models with a centralized 
market would predict.  It seems that more efforts are needed to combine the 
insights of the two paradigms in order to provide a better characterization of 
the housing market
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